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Special Comment
Are Antitrust Class Actions Dead In
The Sixth Circuit?*
By LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN**
INTRODUCTION
In Ohio v. Ric-Con Concrete Corp.,' the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently affirmed a de-
nial of class certification by the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio.2 As a result of this decision
the Sixth Circuit has rendered ineffective any use of the class
action device in Sixth Circuit antitrust cases. In effect, the
court held that any district court judge who does not want the
inconvenience of a class action may deny class certification
with little rationale. As the Sixth Circuit's first decision on
class certification in an antitrust case, this holding provides
dangerous precedent for future antitrust class actions in the
circuit.
This article analyzes the history of the class action pro-
ceedings in the Ric-Con case, compares the result with the
status of class actions in other circuits, and examines how this
* Since this special comment was written the Supreme Court ruled on June 9,
1977 that indirect purchasers in antitrust actions did not have standing to sue. Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 45 U.S.L.W. 411 (U.S. June 9, 1977).
The Court's decision can be criticized for many of the reasons outlined in this
comment. As a result of this decision, legislation has been introduced to restore indi-
rect purchasers the right to recover for antitrust violations. S. 1874, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977).
** Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University College of Law; B.A.,
1971, University of Kansas; J.D. 1974, Georgetown University; member Pennsylvania
and Ohio bars. The author was co-counsel for the State of Ohio in Ohio v. Ric-Con
Corp., during 1975-76. The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the
author and do not necessarily represent the position of the State of Ohio.
Research was provided by Susan Hovey, J.D. 1977, Ohio Northern University; and
Diana Peppler, J.D. 1977, Ohio Nothern University.
I Ohio v. Ric-Con Concrete Corp., No. 75-2167 (6th Cir., Aug. 6. 1976).
69 F.R.D. 604 (S.D. Ohio 1975). The lower court case was originally styled as
Ohio v. Richter Concrete Corp., but the name "Richter" was changed to "Ric-Con"
in an amended complaint. For clarity the case is referred to as Ric-Con.
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decision effectively eliminates a viable use of class actions in
antitrust actions in the Sixth Circuit.
I. HISTORY OF THE CASE
On October 18, 1973, the state of Ohio filed a complaint
in United States district court3 against several suppliers of
ready-mix concrete in the Cincinnati area, alleging illegal price
fixing under the federal antitrust laws.4 After filing the com-
plaint, the State of Ohio filed a Motion to Maintain a Class
Action. The class was to consist of the State of Ohio (on behalf
of its agencies, departments, divisions, commissions, institu-
tions, and universities); four counties; and villages, municipal-
ities, townships, and public school districts in the four coun-
ties. There were 185 purported class members. Following a
hearing on the class action issue, the district court denied
plaintiff's motion for class certification. The court's order
stated that the facts were substantially the same as those in
Bill Minnielli Cement Contracting, Inc. v. Richter Concrete
Corp.,5 and because class certification was denied in that case,
the court felt compelled to deny class certification in the pres-
ent case.'
The class action was denied for four reasons: predominant
individual questions of impact resulting from the presence of
direct and indirect purchasers in the same class; predominant
individual questions of fraudulent concealment; lack of nu-
merosity; and the existence of collateral estoppel as a basis
for recovery by other ready-mix buyers. The court noted gen-
erally that class certification was denied for lack of common-
The case followed two proceedings arising out of the same factual circumstances.
In November, 1970, a grand jury called by the Department of Justice indicted two
Cincinnati ready-mix supply companies for price-fixing. In 1972 a private treble dam-
age action was filed against several Cincinnati ready-mix companies including the two
indicted by the grand jury. In the private action the plaintiff moved for class certifica-
tion, which was denied. It should be noted, however, that the class included contrac-
tors (or middlemen) as well as political subdivisions. The class was denied for reasons
discussed in the text accompanying notes 7-9 infra. The denial of the motion was not
appealed. Bill Minnielli Cement Contracting, Inc. v. Richter Concrete Corp., 62 F.R.D.
381 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970); and § 4 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
62 F.R.D. 381 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
69 F.R.D. at 605-06.
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ality and manageability.7 The State of Ohio appealed the
denial of class certification,8 and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
lower court's decision. The appellate court simply reasoned
that there was no abuse of discretion?
I1. ERRORS BY THE DISTRICT COURT
A lower court's denial of certification of class action will
not be overruled unless there is abuse of discretion.'" Where the
trial court based its decision on erroneous reasons, however,
this constitutes abuse of discretion." In Ric-Con, the court
based its decision in every instance on erroneous reasons. The
district court therefore abused its discretion and should have
been overruled.
A. Predominant Individual Questions of Impact
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
in pertinent part that a class action may be maintained where
"there are questions of law or fact common to the class"1 2 and
where these "questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only indi-
vidual members .
The district court in Ric-Con held that "the presence of
both direct and indirect purchasers within a single class gives
rise to individual questions of impact which predominate over
any common questions of law or fact."" The court was imply-
ing either that the indirect purchasers did not have standing,
or that differing methods of purchase resulted in differing
7Id.
It was appealed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
Ohio v. Ric-Con Concrete Corp., No. 75-2167 (6th Cir., Aug. 6, 1976).
0ott v. Speedwriting Pub. Co., 518 F.2d 1143, 1150-51 (6th Cir. 1975). See also
3b MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.50, at 23-1105 (2d ed. 1976).
" National Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Shaw-Walker Co., 111 F.2d 497, 507 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 673 (1940); accord, Someville v. Capital Transit Co., 192
F.2d 413, 414 (D.C.Cir. 1951); Kernan v. Kernan, 165 F.2d 232, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
22 FE. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
23 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
, 69 F.R.D. at 605. Indirect purchasers in the instant case are government entities
that purchased ready-mix concrete through contractors. Direct purchasers are govern-
ment entities that purchased directly through suppliers. Brief for Appellant at 7-12,
Ohio v. Ric-Con Concrete Corp., No. 75-2167 (6th Cir., Nov. 12, 1975).
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amounts of damages which were predominant questions.'5 The
court apparently based this holding on one of two theories,
neither of which is correct.
The holding that indirect purchasers lack standing is con-
trary to the weight of authority" and, in fact, does not follow
the Sixth Circuit's liberal standing requirement." In addition,
the policy in favor of antitrust enforcement would be seriously
frustrated by denying standing to indirect purchasers.' s In de-
termining that indirect purchasers lack standing, the court in-
correctly read the "pass-on" concept in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp. '9 Hanover Shoe was an action by
,0 Courts have been vague, unclear, and at times inconsistent in the use of terms
such as "impact," "liability," "injury," "causation," and "damage." To recover under
the antitrust laws, plaintiff must prove a violation, the existence of legal injury, and
the amount of damage. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). Thus, in addition to proving the conspir-
acy, a plaintiff must show that the conspiracy resulted in "legal injury" (or the fact of
damage) and must then prove the amount of the damages. In other words, a plaintiff
must prove both impact on the market and impact on himself. The impact on the
market or fact of damage may be inferred from defendant's wrongful acts where there
is evidence of a decline in "prices, profits and values." Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1969) (citing Biegelow v. RKO Radio Pictures,
Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946).) See also Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.,
282 U.S. 555 (1931); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S.
359 (1927). The Sixth Circuit has used a liberal "fact of damage" standard in holding
that illegal activity strongly indicates that "some damages must have resulted."
Gaines v. Carrollton Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc., 496 F.2d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1974). For
a discussion of current requirements for proof of legal injury and the amount of dam-
ages in antitrust cases, see Weinberg, Recent Trends in Antitrust Civil Action Determi-
nations, 1976 DUKE L.J. 485, 488-500.
" See note 23 infra for cases holding that indirect purchasers have standing.
,7 See text accompanying notes 25 through 30 infra for a discussion of the Sixth
Circuit standing requirement.
'1 Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore . . . and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, includ-
ing a reasonable attorney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). The importance of private antitrust suits brought pursuant to
this statute was stated by the Supreme Court in Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United
States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969):
As the special provision awarding treble damages to successful plaintiffs
illustrates, Congress has encouraged private antitrust litigation not merely
to compensate those who have been directly injured but also to vindicate the
important public interest in free competition.
Accord, Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 365 (9th Cir. 1955).
" 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
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a shoe manufacturer against a shoe machinery manufacturer to
recover treble damages for overcharges in leasing shoe manu-
facturing machinery. The defendant asserted that plaintiff had
suffered no injury, because it had passed on any overcharges
by raising the prices of its shoes. The Supreme Court rejected
this argument and affirmed the district and appellate courts'
holdings that plaintiffs had suffered injury. Some courts have
relied on this holding to deny standing to indirect purchasers,' "
interpreting the Supreme Court's rejection of the defense that
overcharges had been passed on to purchasers of shoes as an
implicit holding that indirect or remote purchasers do not have
standing.2'
A close reading of the case, however, indicates that the
Court in Hanover Shoe intended to encourage private enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws.22 More recent opinions have granted
25 Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 481, 484 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); Balmac, Inc. v. American Metal Prods. Corp., 1972 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 74, 235
(N.D. Cal. 1972); Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620, 628-27 (D. Colo. 1971);
Philadelphia Housing Auth. v. American Radiator & Std. Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D.
13, 23-30, (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub noma. Mangano v. American Radiator and Std.
Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971); United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l.
Corp., 312 F. Supp. 319,321 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Philadelphia Housing Auth. v. American
Radiator & Std. Sanitary Corp., 323 F. Supp. 381, 383-86 (E.D. Pa. 1970). These courts
all interpreted Hanover as strictly limiting standing to those plaintiffs who were in
privity with the defendant or those plaintiffs who were removed from defendant only
by virtue of a cost-plus contract.
21 Balmac, Inc. v. American Metal Prods. Corp., 1972 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 74, 235
(N.D. Cal. 1972); Travis v. Fairmont Foods Co., 346 F. Supp. 679, 680 (E.D. Pa. 1972);
Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620, 631, 637 (D. Colo. 1971); Philadelphia
Housing Auth. v. American Radiator & Std. Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa.
1970), af'd sub. nom. Mangano v. American Radiator and Std. Sanitary Corp., 438
F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971); United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 312 F. Supp. 319,
321 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
2 One of the major reasons for rejecting the pass-on defense in Hanover Shoe was
that the party in the best position to pursue the action would be eliminated, leaving
only a plaintiff with a small stake in the outcome. As a result antitrust enforcement
would suffer.
[TJhese ultimate consumers. . .would have only a tiny stake in a lawsuit
and little interest in attempting a class action. In consequence, those who
violate the antitrust laws . . . would retain the fruits of their illegality be-
cause no one was available [to] bring suit against them. Treble-damage
actions, the importance of which the Court has many times emphasized,
would be substantially reduced in effectiveness.
392 U.S. at 494.
The court in In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation clearly felt that the Hanover
Shoe decision had been incorrectly applied by courts. In holding that the rejection of
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standing to indirect purchasers for this and other reasons.? In
many instances the indirect purchasers were consumers of
products sold in chains of distribution even more complex than
that which existed in the purchase of ready-mix concrete. 24
In addition, the district court in Ric-Con failed to apply
the passing-on defense in Hanover Shoe could not be used to prevent indirect purchas-
ers from having standing, the court noted:
The attempt to transform a rejection of a defense because it unduly hampers
antitrust enforcement into a reason for a complete refusal to entertain the
claims of a certain class of plaintiffs seems an ingenious attempt to turn the
decision and its underlying rationale on its head.
1973-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) . 74, 680, at 94,978-79 (D. Conn. 1973). The court rejected
those cases which applied Hanover Shoe to require privity as "stretching Hanover Shoe
beyond all recognition." Id. at 94,979.
23 Several cases have interpreted Hanover Shoe as allowing standing to indirect
purchasers because (1) Hanover involved "passing-on" as a defense, not an offensive
tactic by plaintiffs to gain standing; and (2) Hanover's denial of "passing-on" as a
defense was intended to foster, rather than to limit, private antitrust enforcement.
Extending the decision in order to refuse a certain class of plaintiffs standing would
completely undercut the decision and its rationale. In re Western Liquid Asphalt
Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 196-99 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); Carnivale
Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Master Key
Antitrust Litigation, 1973-2 TaDE CAS. (CCH) T 74,680 (D. Conn. 1973); Boshes v.
General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 594-95 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Philadelphia v. American
Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 62 (D.N.J. 1971).
Other cases also allowing indirect purchasers standing are: In re Multidistrict
Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 125-29 (9th Cir. 1973); Armco Steel Corp. v. North
Dakota, 376 F.2d 206, 210-11 (8th Cir. 1967); In re Toilet Seat Antitrust Litigation,
1976 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60, 915 (E.D. Mich. 1976); In re Plywood Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 1976-1 TRADE CAs. (CCH) 60, 805 (E.D. La. 1976); Bray v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
392 F. Supp. 851,862-63 (N.D. Cal. 1975); State v. Ampress Brick Co., 67 F.R.D. 461,
466-67 (N.D. Ill, 1975); Southern Gen. Builders, Inc. v. Maule Indus. Inc., 1973-1
TRADE CAS. (CCH) 74,484 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Sol S. Turnoff Drug Distrib. v. N. V.
Nederlandsche Combinatic Voor Chemische Industrie, 51 F.R.D. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
24 Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1973-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 74,680 (D. Conn.
1973). In Carnivale the court held that the manfacturers of clothing, plastic bags and
carryalls had standing to sue manfacturers of zipper sliders for their alleged conspiracy
to fix prices, even though the clothing bag makers had purchased the sliders as compo-
nents of completed zippers through zipper manufacturers and assemblers. In Master
Key, indirect governmental purchasers of building hardware (lock, latches, keys, etc.)
were held to have standing to sue manufacturer-distributors for alleged conspiracy to
fix prices and allocate customers. The governmental purchasers did not purchase the
hardware directly from the defendants or their distributors but generally from building
contractors. Plaintiffs alleged they were the actual victims of the conspiracy, for the
overcharges exacted by the defendants were directly reflected in the price they had to
pay for the building hardware they purchased. See also Bray v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
392 F. Supp. 851, 862-63 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (cattlemen alleged price fixing of beef by
retail grocery stores).
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the Sixth Circuit standing test, enunciated in Malamud v. Sin-
clair Oil Corp.,25 which is one of the most liberal in the country.
In Malamud the Sixth Circuit rejected both the target area 26
and the direct injury2 tests applied by many courts as "really
demand[ing] too much from plaintiffs at the pleading stage
of a case. '28 Instead, the court relied on Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp.,29 where the
Supreme Court required that the plaintiff allege injury in fact
and that the "interest . . .to be protected . . .[be] arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute . . . in question."' 0 Considering the Sixth Circuit's
standing requirement in Malamud and the number of courts
which have granted standing to indirect purchasers, it was
error for the district court in Ric-Con to deny class certification
on the basis that indirect purchasers lack standing.
It is also possible to read the court's opinion as denying the
class on the basis that differing methods of purchase resulted
in differing amounts of damages; i.e., that in some instances
certain remote or indirect purchasers might be precluded from
recovery because the overcharge had actually been absorbed by
contractors or other intermediate purchasers. The preclusion of
these purchasers, however, is really a question relating to the
amount of damage rather than the fact of impact or standing.
Once it is recognized that all of the indirect purchasers have
standing because they were "arguably within the zone of inter-
ests to be protected" 31 under the antitrust laws, the fact that
in some instances the overcharges were not passed on creates
individual questions as to the amount of damage, not individ-
ual questions of liability. A significant number of courts have
521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975).
2, The target area test is applied by courts which find liability where the plaintiff
was "within that area of the economy which is endangered by a breakdown of competi-
tive conditions in a particular industry." Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc.,
193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
" The direct injury test is applied by courts which require privity between plain-
tiff and defendant. For an analysis of the target area and direct injury tests as they
relate to standing in antitrust cases, see Comment, Standing to Sue- in Antitrust Cases:
The Offensive Use of Passing-On, 123 U. PA. L. Rav. 976 (1975).
521 F.2d at 1149.
397 U.S. 150.(1970).
" Id. at 153.
31 Id.
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granted class certification where there were common questions
of conspiracy and impact on the market because these issues
predominated over individual questions of damages.
32
The question of the existence of a conspiracy and its im-
pact on the market as a whole can be determined by trial on
the issue of liability without examining individual questions of
each plaintiff's damages.3 3 The Ric-Con court, in stating that
there were individual issues of "impact" which predominated,
was referring to impact on the individual plaintiff (which is a
question of damage, not liability) and for this reason impact
should not have been held to be a predominant individual
question which would be a basis for denying the class.
3' New York v. Darling-Delaware, Inc., 1976-1 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,812, at
68,512-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); In re Plywood Antitrust Litigation, 1976-1 TRADE CAS.
(CCH) $ 60,805, at 68,483-84 (E.D. La. 1976); In re Toilet Seat Antitrust Litigation,
1976-1 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,915, at 69,003 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Dennis v. Saks & Co.,
1975-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,396, at 66,747-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Hemley v. American
Honda Motor Co., 1975 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,457, at 67,060 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re
Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 70 F.R.D. 23, 28-29 (D. Conn. 1975); Link v.
Mercedes-Benz of N. America, Inc., 1975-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,534, at 67,357-58
(E.D. Pa. 1975); Herman v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 1975-1 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,115,
at 65,258-60 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 331,
334-35 (N.D. Il. 1974); Professional Adjusting Sys. of America, Inc. v. General Adjust-
ment Bureau, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 35, 39-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); J.M. Woodhull, Inc. v.
Addressograph-Multigraph Corp., 62 F.R.D. 58, 60-61 (S.D. Ohio 1974); P.D.Q. Inc.
v. Nissan Motor Corp., 61 F.R.D. 372, 374-75 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Cohen v. District of
Columbia Nat'l Bank, 59 F.R.D. 84, 90 (D.D.C. 1972); Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp.,
54 F.R.D. 532, 534 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45,
67-68 (D.N.J. 1971); In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 281
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Butkus v. Chicken Unltd. Enterprises, Inc., 15 F.R. Serv. 2d 1067,
1069 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484, 488-
89 (N.D. Ill. 1969); aff'd in part, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 400
U.S. 348 (1971); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452,
458 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 490 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Minne-
sota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 569-72 (D. Minn. 1968).
Those class actions which were not certified because of predominant individual
questions can generally be distinguished as involving issues other than damages, such
as differing franchise agreements which required individual analysis. See Hehir v.
Shell Oil Co., 1976-1 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,928, at 69,041-42 (D. Mass. 1976); Ple-
kowski v. Ralston Purina Co., 68 F.R.D. 443, 448-54 (M.D. Ga. 1975); McCoy v.
Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 67 F.R.D. 57, 72-74 (N.D. Ill. 1975); In re Transit Co. Tire
Antitrust Litigation, 1975-1 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,144, at 65,416-18 (W.D. Mo. 1975);
Thompson v. TFI Companies, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 140, 147-48 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Hettinger
v. Glass Specialty Co., 59 F.R.D. 286, 294 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Abercrombie v. Lum's, Inc.,
345 F. Supp. 387, 390-91 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
" See note 65 infra for cases adopting a bifurcated trial procedure for class action
antitrust suits.
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B. Predominant Individual Questions of Fraudulent
Concealment
The court in Ric-Con also denied class certification be-
cause of highly individualized questions of fraudulent conceal-
ment24 The state of Ohio had alleged fraudulent concealment
in its complaint in order to recover damages which might have
been incurred before November 16, 1966, although it was be-
lieved that the conspiracy began in 1967. 31 It was clear that the
plaintiffs were not barred by the statute of limitations from
recovering damages from November 16, 1966, to the present. It
was, therefore, once again a question of the amount of dam-
ages, not the fact of the conspiracy, which was an individual
question. As noted above,3 6 where there is a common question
as to the existence of a conspiracy and its impact on the mar-
ket, courts will generally find this issue to predominate over
individual questions as to the amount of damages suffered by
each plaintiff as a result of the conspiracy.
C. Numerosity Determination
Another reason for denying the class in Ric-Con was that
the state of Ohio had offered conclusive proof of purchase from
defendants by only thirty-seven proposed class members, and
that a "class of 37 [is] not so numerous as to make joinder
impracticable." 7 The district court was wrong on this issue
because its holding was founded on three erroneous assump-
tions: that only direct purchasers had standing;38 that the class
size was too speculative;" and that the numerosity determina-
31 69 F.R.D. at 605.
" Thus any possibility that damages would be sought for the period before 1967
is therefore remote, making it unlikely that there would be any need for proof of
fraudulent concealment.
3' See text accompanying note 32 supra.
69 F.R.D. at 605.
By incorporating the language of the Minnielli decision into the Ric-Con opin-
ion, the court seems to imply that indirect purchasers lack standing. 69 F.R.D. at 605
(citing Bill Minnielli Cement Contracting, Inc. v. Richter Concrete Corp., 62 F.R.D.
381, 386-89 (S.D. Ohio 1973)).
11 "While class size need not be established with precision, we nevertheless believe
it is far too speculative to conclude . . . that all 185 of the proposed class members
bought ready-mix, directly or indirectly, from the defendants." 69 F.R.D. at 605.
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tion was limited to purchases from the named defendants.'
As for the first assumption-that only direct purchasers
have standing-it was noted above that indirect purchasers
should also have standing.4' Thus it was error for the court to
consider only direct purchasers in determining numerosity. 2
The district court's second assumption-that class size
was too speculative-is also incorrect. In a pre-trial hearing on
the class action issue the state of Ohio presented evidence of
actual purchases by a number of plaintiffs. In addition, the
state offered evidence indicating that each type of government
entity included in the class was likely to have purchased ready-
mix concrete at some point during the 4 years.43 In spite of this
proof, the court concluded that it was "far too speculative...
that all 185. . .bought ready-mix. . . from the defendants."44
Contrary to the district court's assertion that the class size
was too speculative, the Sixth Circuit itself requires only that
"some information. . . be presented by plaintiffs from which
the approximate number of class members can be ascer-
tained."4 Here the plaintiff identified by name all of the mem-
bers of the class and offered substantial evidence that each
entity was likely to have used ready-mix concrete over a period
of several years. This is more than sufficient under the Sixth
Circuit standard. To require more places a substantial burden
of developing damage data on the plaintiff before liability for
violating the antitrust laws is determined. Accordingly, it was
error for the district court to require conclusive evidence of
purchases by putative class members before including those
class members in the suit.
10 "The only conclusive evidence shows that 37 proposed class members purchased
directly from defendants." Id.
4, See notes 16-24 supra and accompanying text.
42 In any event, there were probably more than 37 direct purchasers.
3 Appendix to Brief for Appellant at 307-08, 319-20, Ohio v. Ric-Con Concrete
Corp., No. 75-2167 (6th Cir., Nov. 12, 1976).
4 69 F.R.D. at 605.
11 Sims v. Parke Davis & Co., 334 F. Supp. 774, 781 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd. 453 F.2d
1259 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972) (emphasis added). Information
on class size may be shown by affidavits or other simple evidentiary mechanisms.
Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 338 (D. Minn. 1967). See Siegel v. Realty
Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Thomas v. Clarke, 54 F.R.D. 245 (D.
Minn. 1971); Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Fischer v. Kletz,
41 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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As for the third incorrect determination, the court exam-
ined only those purchases of ready-mix from the named defen-
dants.46 A conspirator in an antitrust case is liable for the acts
of his co-conspirators whether they are named defendants or
not. 7 The Sixth Circuit has explicitly adopted this standard of
liability. 8 In addition, where the existence of a conspiracy is
proven, defendants will be responsible for overcharges sus-
tained on purchases from vendors not. part of the price-fixing
conspiracy where plaintiffs prove that as a result of the conspir-
acy overall price levels in the relevant market were raised.49
Therefore, it was error for the court to require that each pur-
ported class member must have purchased ready-mix from a
named defendant.
Based on these three erroneous determinations, the court
found that there was conclusive evidence that only thirty-seven
of the proposed class members purchased directly from defen-
dants, and that this was not so numerous a class as to make
joinder impracticable.Y' If the court had allowed the number to
reflect both direct and indirect purchasers who had purchased
not only from named defendants but other sellers as well, and
if the court had accepted the well-defined, specifically-named
class list, the number of class members would have been 185.
Classes of this size are quite commonly certified as being so
numerous that joinder is impracticable.51 Because the court
incorrectly applied too strict a standard, it found only thirty-
seven class members. Even this class size, however, should
have been held to be sufficiently numerous.5 2
" 69 F.R.D. at 605.
17 Washington v. American Pipe and Const. Co., 280 F. Supp. 802, 804-05 (W.D.
Wash.), appeal dismissed, 393 F.2d 568 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 842 (1968).
0 Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipeworks, 127 F. 23 (6th Cir. 1903), aff'd,
203 U.S. 390 (1906).
11 Bray v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 851, 863 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Wall
Prods. Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 357 F. Supp. 832, 840 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Washing-
ton v. American Pipe & Const. Co., 280 F. Supp. 802, 805-07 (W.D. Wash. 1968).
69 F.R.D. at 605.
, Butkus v. Chicken Unltd. Enter., Inc., 15 F.R. Serv. 2d 1067 (N.D. Iii. 1971);
Contract Buyers League v. F. & F. Inv., 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. ill. 1969), aff'd sub
nom., Baker v. F. & F. Inv., 420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1970).
1Z Thompson v. T.F.I. Companies, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 140 (N.D. Il. 1974) (14 persons
not too numerous for joinder); Anderson v. Home Style Stores, Inc., 58 F.R.D. 125




As part of its order, the district court noted that "if the
State were to prevail on the issue of price-fixing conspiracy, it
would seem to inure to the benefit of other ready-mix buyers
under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. '5 3 This doctrine is
irrelevant to a determination of whether a given case meets the
prerequisites'of Rule 23. If it could be invoked as a reason for
denying the class in this instance, it would be an equally valid
reason to deny certification of any class action. Nevertheless,
it is far from settled that collateral estoppel may be used offen-
sively by a plaintiff applying a judgment against a defendant
which was originally obtained by a different plaintiff against
the same defendant.-4 Even assuming the doctrine may be used
offensively, it may be unavailable to class members for two
reasons. First, if a plaintiff should enter into a settlement with
a defendant, as is often the case in antitrust actions, there
would be no final judgment which the aborted class members
could apply collaterally. 5 Second, the statute of limitations
could run by the time one plaintiff's case reached final judg-
ment, thus permanently barring any action the aborted class
members might wish to bring. Thus, it was error to apply the
doctrine of collateral estoppel in determining the class action
issue.
E. Manageability
The court rejected plaintiffs contention that the case was
manageable, but gave no specific reason other than incorporat-
ing the reasons previously given in its opinion in the Minnielli
case." The court was apparently referring to the complexities
69 F.R.D. at 605.
Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329-
30 (1971); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 766-67, 770-71, 773-74 (3d Cir.)
(dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
United States v. International Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502 (1953).
'6 For the foregoing reasons, we decline at this time to certify the present
case as a class action. We recognize that the attorneys for the State are of
the firm belief that this is not such an involved or complicated case as to
bar class action certification on grounds of commonality or manageability.
After full consideration of both the present case and Minnielli, however, we




of determining proof of injury iin a class of direct and indirect
purchasers which had purchased different amounts of concrete
through different methods. The court's certification require-
ment of proof of injury or impact on each plaintiff made the
case appear even more complex than it actually was.
The court required each potential class member to present
proof of purchase in order to prove impact before they could be
counted as a member of the class. It has already been shown
that impact on each plaintiff is a damage question, and is
relevant only after the fact of the conspiracy and its impact on
the relevant market has been proven. 7 It is for this reason that
the court erroneously decided that the case was unmanageable.
Moreover, a class should not be denied certification be-
cause of difficulities in determining damages." Antitrust cases
are by their nature complex and class actions make them even
more so. But to deny a class for these reasons is contrary to the
intent of the antitrust laws and Rule 23. This is not to say that
some cases could not properly be denied on the basis of man-
ageability, where the class consists of millions of plaintiffs59 or
5 See text accompanying note 33 supra for a discussion of impact and damages.
5A The basis for this position is that:
To deny a class determination on the ground that the computation of dam-
ages might render the cause unmanageable would encourage corporations to
commit grand acts of fraud instead of small ones with the thought of raising
the spectre of unmanageability to defeat the class action.
In re Memorex Sec. Cases, 61 F.R.D. 88, 103 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
See In re Cessna Aircraft Distributorship Antitrust Litigation, 518 F.2d 213, 215
(8th Cir. 1975); In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 200-01 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); In re Toilet Seat Antitrust Litigation, 1976-1
TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,915, at 69,004 (E.D. Mich. 1976); New York v. Darling-
Delaware, Inc., 1976-1 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,812, at 68,513-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Link
v. Mercedes-Benz of N. America, Inc., 1975-2 TRADE CAB. (CCH) 60,534, at 67,358
(E.D. Pa. 1975); Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 331, 335 (N.D.
Ill. 1974); J.M. Woodhull, Inc. v. Addressograph-Multigraph Corp., 62 F.R.D. 58, 60
(S.D. Ohio 1974); In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 299, 305-06
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
" Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (proposed class action on
behalf of 2.25 million odd-lot traders on the N.Y. Stock Exchange); Boshes v. General
Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (proposed certification of 17 million
automobile purchasers rejected on basis of unmanageability); Philadelphia v. Ameri-
can Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. 1971) (class action not certified because there were
6 million class members); In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equip., 52 F.R.D.
398 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (a class action on behalf of all American citizens was held inappro-
priate); United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 312 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
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where there are extremely complex chains of distribution."
Perhaps the most favorable case involving issues similar to
those in Ric-Con is Windham v. American Brands, Inc.6" That
case involved a proposed class of more that 20,000 plaintiffs,
who alleged injury from price fixing and other restraints of
trade in the tobacco industry. The proposed class members
were sellers of or had an economic interest in the sale of flue-
cured tobacco. The plaintiffs had varying roles in the market
and some had antagonistic interests "because of the quality of
their tobacco, or their roles in the market. . . ."I' The case
involved a number of other complexities including the exist-
ence of thirty-six tobacco warehouses in eleven geographic loca-
tions, 161 grades of tobacco, and varying pricing procedures.
Because of these complexities the district court concluded that
individual issues predominated over common issues. It further
determined that the differing impacts involved and the elabo-
rate proof requirements made the case unmanageable. Based
on these conclusions, the lower courts denied the class.
The Fourth Circuit reversed this judgment and held that
"there is almost a rebuttable presumption that such a class
action should be allowed where there is a plausible claim of
violation of the Sherman Act. ' '1 3 The court considered the pub-
lic policy in favor of granting private recovery in antitrust suits
and went on to hold that it was "an abuse of discretion...
not to allow a class action at least with respect to issues of
alleged violation[s] of the Sherman Act."64 The Fourth Circuit
noted that after the conspiracy issue had been determined, the
trial court had discretion to decide how to dispose of the issues
of causation and damage.
Like the lower court in Windham, the lower court in Ric-
(class action on behalf of all egg consumers in the United States denied as being "so
large that is is unmistakeably beyond the limit of a permissible class action." Id. at
321.)
6o For an excellent analysis of the manageability issue and other issues relating to
the standing of remote purchasers in antitrust actions, see Comment, Antitrust
Law-Private Actions-Remote Purchasers Have Standing to Challenge Alleged
Price-Fixing-Carnivale.Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N. Y.
1975), 10 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1207, 1222 (1976).
539 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1976).
62 Id. at 1019.
Id. at 1021.
64 Id. at 1021-22.
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Con raised the issue of manageability as a major obstacle. The
granting of a class in Windham, where the facts were far more
complex than those in Ric-Con, is strong support for the re-
quirement of class certifications where there are common ques-
tions of conspiracy. The Fourth Circuit established in
Windham that in view of the strong federal policy favoring
private remedies in antitrust cases, the presence of complex
damages issues should not preclude class certification. This
should be true at the very least as to those issues of liability
where common questions could most effectively be adjudicated
on a class-wide basis. 5
CONCLUSION
In the order affirming the denial of the class, the Sixth
Circuit held, without stating any reason, that there was no
abuse of discretion. Because the circuit court could uphold the
district court's denial of class certification even if there was
abuse of discretion on every basis but one, it is possible that
they found abuse of discretion in all but one instance. Further-
more, given the status of the case law in the Sixth Circuit on
the other points-standing, definition of class size, and the
clear error in applying collateral estoppel as a basis for denying
class actions-it would appear that the most likely basis upon
which the lower court was upheld was unmanageability of the
class.
It is conceivable that the court felt that the individual
questions of damage were so complex that they predominated
over common issues of liability. Whether the reason for uphold-
ing the lower court was manageability or commonality, future
antitrust plaintiffs wishing to maintain class actions in the
Sixth Circuit face serious difficulties in attempting to obtain
class certification. Unless every plaintiff is at the same level on
the chain of distribution, and unless every plaintiff puchased
through the identical system, a district court seemingly has
complete discretion to deny the class on the basis of managea-
" As seen in more recent class action antitrust suits, the courts have used a
bifurcated trial procedure. The question of liability is first determined and then, if
necessary, the issue of damages will be resolved. New York v. Darling-Delaware, Inc.,
1976-1 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,812, at 68,514 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Link v. Mercedes-Benz
of N. America, Inc., 1975-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,534 at 67,358 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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bility and commonality. Because of the reluctance of many
courts to handle these complex cases, it is inevitable that they
will frequently use these grounds to deny class actions. Many
potential plaintiffs unable to be included in the class are un-
likely to bring actions of their own because they lack resources.
Such a result was hardly the intent of the antitrust laws or the
class action device. Although the answer may be legislative, the
true intent of the class action device should not be thwarted by
the district courts.
